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Introduction
After every major regime change, be it the fall of communism or the Arab Spring, the new regime must decide on the extent to which it should replace major and minor players in both public administration and the private sector. Germany presents a particularly interesting case for studying this phenomenon because after a war that left the country morally and economically devastated, the post-war reconstruction in its western part (the Federal Republic) is generally seen as both a political and economic success. I thus investigate the issue of post-regime changes phenomenon by comparing individual career paths during two historical periods: WWII and the post-war reconstruction era. Specifically, using person-level data from a 1971 retrospective survey, I derive measures of association for employment industry (the worker's sector of employment) and occupational status for the same individuals at the beginning and end of the 1939-1950 decade (which includes WWII) and the 1950-1960 and 1960-1971 post-war decades in democratic West Germany. I then perform a comparative analysis that documents a high degree of continuity in the German labor market before and after World War II; that is, changes in individual careers in the WWII era greatly resemble those in the post-war decades.
Even during WWII, when the Nazi regime restricted personal and economic freedoms considerably or removed them completely, some elements of a market economy still persisted in Germany. The stock exchange, for example, remained open, although the regime froze stock prices at the beginning of 1943 and often "outsourced" state enterprise (including racially or politically motivated expropriations) to private businesses (Aly, 2011) . Not that advice was lacking on the benefits of competition (Schmölders, 1942) : even after the Soviets had defeated the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad (generally seen as a turning point of WWII), German economist Günter Schmölders (1943) expressed concern about changes in the tax system not sufficiently rewarding entrepreneurial success.
In fact, the German war economy relied heavily on resources (including food and forced labor) drawn from occupied territories (Aly, 2011) , meaning that toward the end of the war and during the years immediately following it, economic breakdown occurred. As Hirshleifer (1963) notes, "[t]ransportation had generally stopped, and with it practically all industrial production" (p. 84). Immediately after the war, the German economy still faced price restraints implemented in the pre-war period to address excess money supply, as well as a division into four occupation zones (with trade restrictions between them), loss of territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, a housing and refugee problem, and the temporary cessation of regular foreign trade. Beginning in 1948, however, currency reform, the return of about 1 2 million remaining prisoners of war from the western Allied powers (Hirshleifer, 1963) , and the establishment of support and cooperation between these powers and the new West
Germany initiated a period of economic growth that Germans still refer to as the Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder).
To put these developments into a macroeconomic perspective, Figure 1 displays the log of GDP for (West) Germany, the UK and the U.S. from 1870 (the year before German unification under Bismarck) until 1989 (the year the Berlin Wall was toppled and one year before German reunification). As the figure shows, all three economies recovered from the two world wars and the Great Depression along a steady growth path, and all were characterized by significant long-term growth. In fact, a projection of pre-1914 growth trends into the future shows that not only for the U.S. but also for Germany, the country that lost both world wars, GDP seems to have caught up to its pre-WWI trend. , 1950-1960 and 1960-1971) . To control for younger cohorts whose lives and careers were massively perturbed (if not lost) during the war, the comparison focuses on birth cohorts who already had some work experience at the outbreak of war and were thus less affected by the draft. That is, even though age groups 18 to 45 were subject to conscription and heavily recruited early in the war (Absolon, 1960, p. 153) , men older than 30 found it easier to obtain "indispensable" (unabkömmlich) status (e.g., as war industry workers, administrators, and in some cases, even as celebrities), which allowed them to continue in their civil jobs. 2 For these men, this status was granted for at least 3 months and had to be actively renounced by the recruitment office, whereas for younger men, the maximum "indispensable" period was only 3 months (Absolon, 1960, p. 142 To represent the relations between employment industry (and occupational status) at the beginning and end of each decade, I use two alternative measures of association (Agresti, 1984, p. 23f.; Freund and Wilson, 1997, p. 578 ): Pearson's contingency coefficient
4 Another development, the comparatively strong decline in agriculture, seems to be a longterm trend because it is observed for the entire1939-1971 period. 5 For example, Ludwig Erhard, who is regarded as the architect of the post-war Economic Miracle, was already working on post-war economic planning at the end of 1942 (Ritschl, 2005 ; http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Erhard).
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where χ 2 is the χ 2 -statistic of the χ 2 independence test and only valid if the number of expected observations in each cell is at least 5. To ensure this latter, I reduce the number of employment industry/occupational status categories from 15 to 10. Tables 2 and 3 report the measures of association for employment industry and occupational status, respectively. Table A1 (Table A2) Group  1900  39  50  60  71  1  1901  38  49  59  70  1  1902  37  48  58  69  1  1903  36  47  57  68  1  1904  35  46  56  67  1  1905  34  45  55  66  2  1906  33  44  54  65  2  1907  32  43  53  64  2  1908  31  42  52  63  2  1909  30  41  51  62  3  1910  29  40  50  61  3  1911  28  39  49  60  3  1912  27  38  48  59  3  1913  26  37  47  58  3  1914  25  36  46  57  3  1915  24  35  45  56  4  1916  23  34  44  55  4  1917  22  33  43  54  4  1918  21  32  42  53  4  1919  20  31  41  52 4 Note: The shadings in the tables highlight the age correspondences between birth cohort groups 1 and 3 and 2 and 4, respectively. Sum of Column Percentages 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
